This article is about a co-ordinated attack on US Outposts in Kamdesh, a border area in the remote Province of Nuristan. If you read down into the article, it discusses recently announced plans to abandon Nuristan in favor of protecting the population centers. My question (not really a question) is, how can we make plans to defend the "population centers" is we abandon the border areas and allow our enemies free and unfettered use of the passes to Pakistan?
As the wars have ground on, the doctrine of allowing the military to fight the wars have disintegrated. Rules of engagement that effectively shackle our troops and firepower, decisions to abandon years of struggle and numerous casualties made in the shadows, like the decisions to abandon the borders. Have you seen that in the news? A Commander makes a statement about his request for forces and is summoned to a "conference (and photo op)" on Air Force One and the National Security Advisor makes statements about the Commander not "having a full appreciation for the theater strategy".
What a bunch of BS. What about Obama's statements about re-inforcing Afghanistan and "winning"? More politically expedient throw away lines made because at the time Iraq was a desperate situation in the process of imploding and Afghanistan appeared to be a sure thing.
Jeff B.
This is where the attacks took place:
This is who the FOB is named for:
As the wars have ground on, the doctrine of allowing the military to fight the wars have disintegrated. Rules of engagement that effectively shackle our troops and firepower, decisions to abandon years of struggle and numerous casualties made in the shadows, like the decisions to abandon the borders. Have you seen that in the news? A Commander makes a statement about his request for forces and is summoned to a "conference (and photo op)" on Air Force One and the National Security Advisor makes statements about the Commander not "having a full appreciation for the theater strategy".
What a bunch of BS. What about Obama's statements about re-inforcing Afghanistan and "winning"? More politically expedient throw away lines made because at the time Iraq was a desperate situation in the process of imploding and Afghanistan appeared to be a sure thing.
Jeff B.
8 US Troops Die in Heavy Afghan Combat
October 05, 2009
Long War Journal|by Bill Roggio
U.S. and Afghan forces beat back a brazen assault on two joint outposts in the eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. The attack was led by Taliban commander Dost Mohammed and was aided by al Qaeda's Shadow Army. Eight U.S. troops, seven Afghan troops, and an unspecified number of enemy fighters were killed during the fighting, which ended after U.S. air and artillery pounded the fighters in a counterattack.
The U.S. military said the fighters launched the attack on the two remote outposts in the district of Kamdish, just 10 miles from the Pakistani border, after organizing at a nearby mosque and a village. More than 300 fighters were involved in the assault, according to Quqnoos, an Afghan newspaper.
The fighting was said to be intense and lasted for several hours. It ended after U.S. attack helicopters, strike fighters, and artillery pounded the insurgent assault teams. Eight U.S. and seven Afghan security personnel have been reported killed, and the district police chief and 13 policemen were captured. The U.S. military did not provide an estimate of enemy killed, but said U.S. and Afghan forces “inflicted heavy enemy casualties” during the counterattack.
A 'complex attack'
The U.S. military said the attack was “complex,” meaning it was well organized and executed. The fighters used assault rifles, heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and heavy weapons such as rockets and mortars. The attack was coordinated and the fighters were able to withdraw from the battlefield in an organized fashion while under heavy fire. According to one report, the bodies of only five enemy fighters were found in the aftermath of the attack.
"This was a complex attack in a difficult area,” said Colonel Randy George, the commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior.
The U.S. military described the attackers as “Nuristani tribal militia” and said that “the sources of the conflict in the area involve complex tribal, religious and economic dynamics.” Afghan officials described the attackers as Taliban, Uzbek, and Arab fighters who crossed into Afghanistan from Pakistan.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the Taliban was behind the attack; he also said the fate of the captured policemen has yet to be determined.
The attack took place as the U.S. military has stated it was prepared to withdraw from the Nuristan region.
“Coalition forces' previously announced plans to depart the area as part of a broader realignment to protect larger population centers remain unchanged,” the U.S. military said in the press release on the attack.
Several U.S. analysts and think tanks have advocated withdrawing from rural regions in eastern Afghanistan.
Al Qaeda’s Shadow Army played a role in the attack
While the U.S. military has portrayed today’s Nuristan assault as being conducted by local “Nuristani tribal militia,” U.S. military and intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said al Qaeda’s paramilitary Shadow Army participated in the attack.
The attack was launched by Taliban leader Dost Mohammed, a senior U.S. military intelligence official who specializes in the situation along the Afghan-Pakistani border told The Long War Journal. The official said that elements from the Shadow Army “stiffened” Dost’s forces, which are considered able and effective fighters in their own right.
Dost is the Taliban’s shadow governor of Nuristan province, who has close links to al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban just across the border. “He’s an operator, a big, big commander for Nuristan, and has lots of resources,” a U.S. expert who advises the U.S. government on the Taliban told The Long War Journal.
Dost has occasionally run afoul of the decisions made by the Taliban’s executive council, or the Shura Majlis, over leadership decisions in the region.
“In 2007, Dost Mohammed was against the Quetta Shura appointment of Maulvi Abdul Kabir, a Zadran Pashtun Taliban leader with strong links to Omar, as the Taliban's Eastern Zone Commander,” the U.S. expert, who wished to remain anonymous, said. “Dost has always enjoyed semi-autonomy control over his area of operations and his own resources in Nuristan.”
Dost’s forces and the Shadow Army conducted a somewhat similar attack in July 2008 in the village of Wanat in Nuristan. A force estimated at between 200 to 400 fighters assaulted a small outpost as it was being built. The daylong firefight pitted the 48 U.S. and 24 Afghan troops against the large Taliban and al Qaeda force. Nine U.S. Soldiers and between 20 to 50 enemy fighters were killed during the fierce battle, in which the assault force briefly entered the outer perimeter of the compound before being repelled.
This is where the attacks took place:
Forward Operating Base Keating
Forward Operating Base Keating is located in the Nuristan Province of Easern Afghanistan, about 15 miles from the Pakistani border. As of March, 2008 it was a small outpost home to Bravo Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team.
FOB Keating and the 1-91 also oversaw Combat Outpost (called COP's) Warheit, a satellite outpost of Keating that is about a three and a half hour hike up the mountain. Small outposts like Warheit are usually home to one or two platoons of soldiers from the ANA and U.S. Military and are usually set up in very remote areas to watch for any increases in Taliban activity.
In the vicinity of FOB Keating and COP Warheit Bravo Company and the ANA were also attempting to keep the peace between the villages of Nagar, Papristan, Jimjuz, Binuz, upper and lower Kamidesh. Those villages had been fighting amongst each other long before coalition forces entered the area.
This is who the FOB is named for:
Army 1st Lt. Benjamin D. Keating
27, of Shapleigh, Maine; assigned to the 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition), 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y.; died Nov. 26 of injuries sustained when his vehicle turned over in Kamdesh, Afghanistan