Lynx Defense

Supreme Court Upholds 4th Amendment.

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  • Axxe55

    Retiretgtshit stirrer
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    Lost in East Texas Elhart Texas
    At this point, I think any states that have a Red Flag Law, those are going to stand as they are, until at some point they are challenged on their own merits in a court of law.

    But, IMO, this ruling does give some hope that I can see, that a challenge to a RFL stands a good chance of being ruled unconstitutional at some point in the future. Sad fact is, some poor guy is going to have to lose everything just to challenge that law.

    RFL's, should never have seen the light of day to begin with.
     

    Glenn B

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    A unanimous decision that warrantless gun confiscation is unconstitutional.
    That is one heck of a blanket statement you made. Where do you see the article say that the police cannot seize a gun without a warrant or as you put it that: "...warrantless gun confiscation is unconstitutional". The article and the justices were talking about the specific grounds the police used to try to justify the particular seizure in question; nowhere did the Supreme Court Justices say a gun cannot ever be confiscated without a warrant as you most certainly seem to imply. In fact, besides pointing out how the officers seizure of these two gun was in fact illegal/unconstitutional - the article also points out some circumstances where a warrant is most definitely not a requirement and thus where the waqrrantless seizure of a gun or other evidence would be perfectly legal.
     

    satx78247

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    I always appreciate your comments; but didju really expect the "Wise Latina" & Elena Kagan to support the U S Constitution ?

    leVieux

    leVieux,

    This case was such a MESS that I would have expected THE WARREN COURT to vote 9-0 to throw it out.

    Sotomayor & Kagan are NOT STUPID & even they would not approve what was essentially a BURGLARY by a LEO, who UNLAWFULLY broke into a private home because he did NOT like what he saw through a window & W/O telling anyone just TOOK the firearm away with him.
    ADDENDA: What the RI LEO did was NO different than if he had looked in a window, saw a copy of PENTHOUSE magazine on the coffee table , did not believe that anybody should be able to possess that magazine & thereafter BROKE INTO the HOME & TOOK the magazine.

    yours, satx
     
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    Renegade

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    It always makes me leery when the liberal supreme court justices back a constitutional right. Especially with regards to firearms.

    They do not care about firearms.

    They were forward looking and realized if we allow this to get firearms, what happens when it is to look for illegal aliens? Or Weed, or some other thing the left loves.
     

    leVieux

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    leVieux,

    This case was such a MESS that I would have expected THE WARREN COURT to vote 9-0 to throw it out.

    Sotomayor & Kagan are NOT STUPID & even they would not approve what was essentially a BURGLARY by a LEO, who UNLAWFULLY broke into a private home because he did NOT like what he saw through a window & W/O telling anyone just TOOK the firearm away with him.
    ADDENDA: What the RI LEO did was NO different than if he had looked in a window, saw a copy of PENTHOUSE magazine on the coffee table , did not believe that anybody should be able to possess that magazine & thereafter BROKE INTO the HOME & TOOK the magazine.

    yours, satx


    NOPD has always legislated via "watch commander desires", rather than following the extant LAW. Federal Judge Barbier finally had to tell them: "The next one of you who does this is going to JAIL himself!"

    leVieux
     

    cycleguy2300

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    For those interested in the text of the case, the court had issue with officers entering the home following a mental health "arrest" and searching for and then seizing several firearms without warrant, without any criminal conduct and without exigency (any exigency would have been gone once the subject was arrested/detained.

    This was a gross over reach of the community care taking doctrine and SCOTUS set them straight that THIS was not how it was intended to work and it was a violation of the subject's 4a rights.

    While the court said the seizures were a violation they did not strike down what police sometimes must do that is force entry into a home for the purpose of medical calls suicidal call, burglar or fire alarms etc where there is an objectively reasonable basis to enter and intervene or provide care.

    See the following excerpt writtennby Justice Kavanuagh:

    "The officers do not need to show that the harm has already occurred or is mere moments away, because knowing that will often be difficult if not impossible in cases involving, for example, a person who is currently suicidal or an elderly person who has been out of contact and may have fallen. If someone is at risk of serious harm and it is reasonable for officers to intervene now, that isenough for the officers to enter. A few (non-exhaustive) examples illustrate the point.Suppose that a woman calls a healthcare hotline or 911and says that she is contemplating suicide, that she has firearms in her home, and that she might as well die. The operator alerts the police, and two officers respond by driving to the woman’s home. They knock on the door but do not receive a response. May the officers enter the home? Of course. The exigent circumstances doctrine applies because the officers have an “objectively reasonable basis” for believing that an occupant is “seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Id., at 400, 403; cf. Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 612 (officers could enter the room of a mentally ill person who had locked herself inside with a knife). After all, a suicidal individual in such a scenario could kill herself at any moment. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to stand idly outside as the suicide takes place."



    And now the entire thing:
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    CANIGLIA v. STROM ET AL.
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    No. 20–157. Argued March 24, 2021—Decided May 17, 2021
    During an argument with his wife, petitioner Edward Caniglia placed a
    handgun on the dining room table and asked his wife to “shoot [him]
    and get it over with.” His wife instead left the home and spent the
    night at a hotel. The next morning, she was unable to reach her hus-
    band by phone, so she called the police to request a welfare check. The
    responding officers accompanied Caniglia’s wife to the home, where
    they encountered Caniglia on the porch. The officers called an ambu-
    lance based on the belief that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others.
    Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation on the
    condition that the officers not confiscate his firearms. But once
    Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia
    sued, claiming that the officers had entered his home and seized him
    and his firearms without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amend-
    ment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the officers.
    The First Circuit affirmed, extrapolating from the Court’s decision in
    Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, a theory that the officers’ removal
    of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “commu-
    nity caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement.
    Held: Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justifies such warrantless
    searches and seizures in the home. Cady held that a warrantless
    search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not vio-
    late the Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
    noted that the officers who patrol the “public highways” are often
    called to discharge noncriminal “community caretaking functions,”
    such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. 413
    U. S., at 441. But searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally
    different, as the Cady opinion repeatedly stressed. Id., at 439, 440–
    442. The very core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right




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    cycleguy2300

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    of a person to retreat into his or her home and “there be free from un-
    reasonable governmental intrusion.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1,
    6. A recognition of the existence of “community caretaking” tasks, like
    rendering aid to motorists in disabled vehicles, is not an open-ended
    license to perform them anywhere. Pp. 3–4.
    953 F. 3d 112, vacated and remanded.
    THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ROBERTS,
    C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined. ALITO, J.,
    and KAVANAUGH, J., filed concurring opinions.

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    cycleguy2300

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    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    No. 20–157
    EDWARD A. CANIGLIA, PETITIONER v.
    ROBERT F. STROM, ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    [May 17, 2021]
    JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
    Decades ago, this Court held that a warrantless search of
    an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not vio-
    late the Fourth Amendment. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
    U. S. 433 (1973). In reaching this conclusion, the Court ob-
    served that police officers who patrol the “public highways”
    are often called to discharge noncriminal “community care-
    taking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles
    or investigating accidents. Id., at 441. The question today
    is whether Cady’s acknowledgment of these “caretaking”
    duties creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrant-
    less searches and seizures in the home. It does not.
    I
    During an argument with his wife at their Rhode Island
    home, Edward Caniglia (petitioner) retrieved a handgun
    from the bedroom, put it on the dining room table, and
    asked his wife to “shoot [him] now and get it over with.” She
    declined, and instead left to spend the night at a hotel. The
    next morning, when petitioner’s wife discovered that she
    could not reach him by telephone, she called the police (re-
    spondents) to request a welfare check.

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    cycleguy2300

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    Respondents accompanied petitioner’s wife to the home,
    where they encountered petitioner on the porch. Petitioner
    spoke with respondents and confirmed his wife’s account of
    the argument, but denied that he was suicidal. Respond-
    ents, however, thought that petitioner posed a risk to him-
    self or others. They called an ambulance, and petitioner
    agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation—
    but only after respondents allegedly promised not to confis-
    cate his firearms. Once the ambulance had taken petitioner
    away, however, respondents seized the weapons. Guided
    by petitioner’s wife—whom they allegedly misinformed
    about his wishes—respondents entered the home and took
    two handguns.
    Petitioner sued, claiming that respondents violated the
    Fourth Amendment when they entered his home and seized
    him and his firearms without a warrant. The District Court
    granted summary judgment to respondents, and the First
    Circuit affirmed solely on the ground that the decision to
    remove petitioner and his firearms from the premises fell
    within a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant
    requirement. 953 F. 3d 112, 121–123, 131 and nn. 5, 9
    (2020). Citing this Court’s statement in Cady that police
    officers often have noncriminal reasons to interact with mo-
    torists on “public highways,” 413 U. S., at 441, the First Cir-
    cuit extrapolated a freestanding community-caretaking ex-
    ception that applies to both cars and homes. 953 F. 3d, at
    124 (“Threats to individual and community safety are not
    confined to the highways”). Accordingly, the First Circuit
    saw no need to consider whether anyone had consented to
    respondents’ actions; whether these actions were justified
    by “exigent circumstances”; or whether any state law per-
    mitted this kind of mental-health intervention. Id., at 122–
    123. All that mattered was that respondents’ efforts to pro-
    tect petitioner and those around him were “distinct from
    ‘the normal work of criminal investigation,’” fell “within the
    realm of reason,” and generally tracked what the court

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    cycleguy2300

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    viewed to be “sound police procedure.” Id., at 123–128, 132–
    133. We granted certiorari. 592 U. S. ___ (2020).
    II
    The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people
    to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
    against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The “‘very
    core’” of this guarantee is “‘the right of a man to retreat into
    his own home and there be free from unreasonable govern-
    mental intrusion.’” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6
    (2013).
    To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all
    unwelcome intrusions “on private property,” ibid.—only
    “unreasonable” ones. We have thus recognized a few per-
    missible invasions of the home and its curtilage. Perhaps
    most familiar, for example, are searches and seizures pur-
    suant to a valid warrant. See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S.
    ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 5–6). We have also held that
    law enforcement officers may enter private property with-
    out a warrant when certain exigent circumstances exist, in-
    cluding the need to “‘render emergency assistance to an in-
    jured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent
    injury.’” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 470 (2011);
    see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403–404
    (2006) (listing other examples of exigent circumstances).
    And, of course, officers may generally take actions that
    “‘any private citizen might do’” without fear of liability.
    E.g., Jardines, 569 U. S., at 8 (approaching a home and
    knocking on the front door).
    The First Circuit’s “community caretaking” rule, how-
    ever, goes beyond anything this Court has recognized. The
    decision below assumed that respondents lacked a warrant
    or consent, and it expressly disclaimed the possibility that
    they were reacting to a crime. The court also declined to
    consider whether any recognized exigent circumstances
    were present because respondents had forfeited the point

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    cycleguy2300

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    Nor did it find that respondents’ actions were akin to what
    a private citizen might have had authority to do if peti-
    tioner’s wife had approached a neighbor for assistance in-
    stead of the police.
    Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justified that ap-
    proach. True, Cady also involved a warrantless search for
    a firearm. But the location of that search was an im-
    pounded vehicle—not a home—“‘a constitutional differ-
    ence’” that the opinion repeatedly stressed. 413 U. S., at
    439; see also id., at 440–442. In fact, Cady expressly con-
    trasted its treatment of a vehicle already under police con-
    trol with a search of a car “parked adjacent to the dwelling
    place of the owner.” Id., at 446–448 (citing Coolidge v. New
    Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971)).
    Cady’s unmistakable distinction between vehicles and
    homes also places into proper context its reference to “com-
    munity caretaking.” This quote comes from a portion of the
    opinion explaining that the “frequency with which . . . vehi-
    cle can become disabled or involved in . . . accident on
    public highways” often requires police to perform noncrim-
    inal “community caretaking functions,” such as providing
    aid to motorists. 413 U. S., at 441. But, this recognition
    that police officers perform many civic tasks in modern so-
    ciety was just that—a recognition that these tasks exist,
    and not an open-ended license to perform them anywhere.
    * * *
    What is reasonable for vehicles is different from what is
    reasonable for homes. Cady acknowledged as much, and
    this Court has repeatedly “declined to expand the scope of
    . . . exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit war-
    rantless entry into the home.” Collins, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip
    op., at 8). We thus vacate the judgment below and remand
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.

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    cycleguy2300

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    EDWARD A. CANIGLIA, PETITIONER v.
    ROBERT F. STROM, ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    [May 17, 2021]
    CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER
    joins, concurring.
    Fifteen years ago, this Court unanimously recognized
    that “[t]he role of a peace officer includes preventing vio-
    lence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to
    casualties.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 406
    (2006). A warrant to enter a home is not required, we ex-
    plained, when there is a “need to assist persons who are se-
    riously injured or threatened with such injury.” Id., at 403;
    see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 49 (2009) (per cu-
    riam) (warrantless entry justified where “there was an ob-
    jectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assis-
    tance was needed, or persons were in danger” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). Nothing in today’s opinion is to
    the contrary, and I join it on that basis.

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    cycleguy2300

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    EDWARD A. CANIGLIA, PETITIONER v.
    ROBERT F. STROM, ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    [May 17, 2021]
    JUSTICE ALITO, concurring.
    I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to ex-
    plain my understanding of the Court’s holding and to high-
    light some important questions that the Court does not de-
    cide.
    1. The Court holds—and I entirely agree—that there is
    no special Fourth Amendment rule for a broad category of
    cases involving “community caretaking.” As I understand
    the term, it describes the many police tasks that go beyond
    criminal law enforcement. These tasks vary widely, and
    there is no clear limit on how far they might extend in the
    future. The category potentially includes any non-law-en-
    forcement work that a community chooses to assign, and
    because of the breadth of activities that may be described
    as community caretaking, we should not assume that the
    Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness applies
    in the same way to everything that might be viewed as fall-
    ing into this broad category.
    The Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S.
    433 (1973), did not recognize any such “freestanding”
    Fourth Amendment category. See ante, at 2, 4. The opinion
    merely used the phrase “community caretaking” in passing.
    413 U. S., at 441.
    2. While there is no overarching “community caretaking”
    doctrine, it does not follow that all searches and seizures

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    cycleguy2300

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    conducted for non-law-enforcement purposes must be ana-
    lyzed under precisely the same Fourth Amendment rules
    developed in criminal cases. Those rules may or may not be
    appropriate for use in various non-criminal-law-enforce-
    ment contexts. We do not decide that issue today.
    3. This case falls within one important category of cases
    that could be viewed as involving community caretaking:
    conducting a search or seizure for the purpose of preventing
    a person from committing suicide. Assuming that peti-
    tioner did not voluntarily consent to go with the officers for
    a psychological assessment,1 he was seized and thus sub-
    jected to a serious deprivation of liberty. But was this war-
    rantless seizure “reasonable”? We have addressed the
    standards required by due process for involuntary commit-
    ment to a mental treatment facility, see Addington v. Texas,
    441 U. S. 418, 427 (1979); see also O’Connor v. Donaldson,
    422 U. S. 563, 574–576 (1975); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
    U. S. 71, 75–77, 83 (1992), but we have not addressed
    Fourth Amendment restrictions on seizures like the one
    that we must assume occurred here, i.e., a short-term sei-
    zure conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether a
    person presents an imminent risk of suicide. Every State
    has laws allowing emergency seizures for psychiatric treat-
    ment, observation, or stabilization, but these laws vary in
    many respects, including the categories of persons who may
    request the emergency action, the reasons that can justify
    the action, the necessity of a judicial proceeding, and the
    nature of the proceeding.2 Mentioning these laws only in
    passing, petitioner asked us to render a decision that could
    —————— 1The Court of Appeals assumed petitioner’s consent was not voluntary
    because the police allegedly promised that they would not seize his guns
    if he went for a psychological evaluation. 953 F. 3d 112, 121 (CA1 2020).
    The Court does not decide whether this assumption was justified. 2See Brief for Petitioner 38–39, n. 4 (gathering state authorities); L.
    Hedman et al., State Laws on Emergency Holds for Mental Health Sta-
    bilization, 67 Psychiatric Servs. 579 (2016).

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    cycleguy2300

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    call features of these laws into question. The Court appro-
    priately refrains from doing so.
    4. This case also implicates another body of law that pe-
    titioner glossed over: the so-called “red flag” laws that some
    States are now enacting. These laws enable the police to
    seize guns pursuant to a court order to prevent their use for
    suicide or the infliction of harm on innocent persons. See,
    e.g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§18125–18148 (West Cum.
    Supp. 2021); Fla. Stat. §790.401(4) (Cum. Supp. 2021);
    Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 140, §131T (2021). They typi-
    cally specify the standard that must be met and the proce-
    dures that must be followed before firearms may be seized.
    Provisions of red flag laws may be challenged under the
    Fourth Amendment, and those cases may come before us.
    Our decision today does not address those issues.
    5. One additional category of cases should be noted: those
    involving warrantless, nonconsensual searches of a home
    for the purpose of ascertaining whether a resident is in ur-
    gent need of medical attention and cannot summon help.
    At oral argument, THE CHIEF JUSTICE posed a question
    that highlighted this problem. He imagined a situation in
    which neighbors of an elderly woman call the police and ex-
    press concern because the woman had agreed to come over
    for dinner at 6 p.m., but by 8 p.m., had not appeared or
    called even though she was never late for anything. The
    woman had not been seen leaving her home, and she was
    not answering the phone. Nor could the neighbors reach
    her relatives by phone. If the police entered the home with-
    out a warrant to see if she needed help, would that violate
    the Fourth Amendment? Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–8.
    Petitioner’s answer was that it would. Indeed, he argued,
    even if 24 hours went by, the police still could not lawfully
    enter without a warrant. If the situation remained un-
    changed for several days, he suggested, the police might be
    able to enter after obtaining “a warrant for a missing per-
    son.” Id., at 9.

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