Alternarively
Russian doctrine hasn't really evolved that much. Attrit 99% of any possible opposition thru artillery preparation before committing maneuver forces precisely because the Soviets (and later Russian) forces don't trust their airpower to deliver in a combined arms fight. Which in Ukraine, they (Ru AF) never did do, going back to Feb 24th. With airpower no longer available as an indirect fire asset, that leaves artillery, rockets, and missiles to prep the battlefield.
Which is exactly what every modern military does before committing limited and costly ground forces.
Then you understand the half-million round artillery barrage was preparation of the battlefield for follow on forces. All sides have recognized the value of artillery in that role since the Napoleonic era. The major advancement the Germans showcased was speed to commit follow on combined arms maneuver forces to encircle their opponents. The Soviets never have understood that, despite knowing full well the value of artillery.Thanks for posting those documents. I have a 74h+ week starting tomorrow, but I'll try to breeze through them as a I can. I've read Ryan's book on the fall of Berlin, it was good.
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Russian doctrine hasn't really evolved that much. Attrit 99% of any possible opposition thru artillery preparation before committing maneuver forces precisely because the Soviets (and later Russian) forces don't trust their airpower to deliver in a combined arms fight. Which in Ukraine, they (Ru AF) never did do, going back to Feb 24th. With airpower no longer available as an indirect fire asset, that leaves artillery, rockets, and missiles to prep the battlefield.
Which is exactly what every modern military does before committing limited and costly ground forces.
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